On Oct 10, 2023, at 22:44, Willy Manga <mangawilly@gmail.com> wrote:
On 11/10/2023 03:52, Delong.com wrote:
On Oct 10, 2023, at 13:36, Matthew Petach <mpetach@netflight.com> wrote: [...] Owen,
RPKI only addresses accidental hijackings. It does not help prevent intentional hijackings. OK, but at least they can help limit the extent of required desegregation in combat unless I misunderstand the whole MAXPREFIXLEN option.
Actually, RFC 9319 do recommend to "avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases". But I recognise that this RFC is not yet implemented everywhere.
It’s a BCP, and may be worthy of reconsideration. The justification in section 1.0 paragraph 3 of that basically points out exactly what I said people _SHOULD_ be doing _IF_ they use max prefix and have failed to do in “84% were vulnerable…”.
RPKI only asserts that a specific ASN must originate a prefix. It does nothing to validate the authenticity of the origination.
Nope… It ALSO asserts (or can assert) an attribute of “Maximum allowed prefix length”. E.g. if I have a ROA for AS65500 to originate 2001:db8::/32 with a “Maximum Length” attribute of /36, then any advertisement (even originated by 65500) that is longer than /36 should be considered invalid.
Yes, but in that scenario any advertisements between /32 and /36 from that prefix originated by AS65500 are *valid* . That's why "ROAs should be as precise as possible, meaning they should match prefixes as announced in BGP" [1]
You completely ignored my statement of the need for appropriate AS-0 ROAs to block those. Owen