It's possible you might have wanted to read the link for the context that pointed this out as sarcastic hyperbole, though the text as-is could (unfortunately) have been read as serious. -- Hugo Slabbert | email, xmpp/jabber: hugo@slabnet.com pgp key: B178313E | also on Signal On Mon 2016-Oct-24 17:17:43 -0500, Mike Hammett <nanog@ics-il.net> wrote:
There's a buffer overrun in some software, so let's just remove all passwords (and keys), since they can get in anyway.
Just pointing out flawed logic.
----- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions http://www.ics-il.com
Midwest-IX http://www.midwest-ix.com
----- Original Message -----
From: "J. Oquendo" <joquendo@e-fensive.net> To: "Steve Mikulasik" <Steve.Mikulasik@civeo.com> Cc: nanog@nanog.org Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 3:53:25 PM Subject: Re: Spitballing IoT Security
On Mon, 24 Oct 2016, Steve Mikulasik wrote:
if we automatically blackholed those IPs as they get updated it could put a big dent in the effectiveness of Zeus.
That would involve someone lifting a finger and implement a config change. Much easier to implement BCP38 or was it RFC 4732? Would never work the moment someone has to lift a finger.
/* I think I'll change my position on BCP38. It's pointless to try blocking spoofed source addresses because:
* It doesn't solve every single problem * It means more effort for service providers * It requires more CPU processing power * Using it will generate smarter "black hats".
https://www.nanog.org/mailinglist/mailarchives/old_archive/2004-10/msg00132....
*/
-- =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ J. Oquendo SGFA, SGFE, C|EH, CNDA, CHFI, OSCP, CPT, RWSP, GREM
"Where ignorance is our master, there is no possibility of real peace" - Dalai Lama
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