On Mon, 9 Jul 2007, Chris L. Morrow wrote:
While S*BGP seem like they may offer additional protections and additional knobs to be used for protecting 'us' from 'them', the very basics are obviously not being done so added complexity is not going to really help :( Or, perhaps its not that its not going to help its just not going to get done because even prefix-lists are 'too hard', apparently.
Yep, if the simple steps were implemented and didn't work, then adding more complex steps may be appropriate. But in the absence of people using even the simple steps, why do people think adding more complexity will work better? The Internet is an on-going example of just-in-time engineering; and fix only when it breaks. Yes, I know someone will claim Yahoo lost gazillion dollars due to the fubared routing. On the other hand, it was fixed in a short amount of time. While lots of folks have their patent pending solutions waiting, are those solutions more cost effective than fixing the occassional fubared nature of the Internet when it happens? So far, the people who pay the bills don't think so. And the Department of Homeland Security isn't paying those bills.