The Department of Defense does posses allot of "network disorganization" mostly on the NIPERNET side. Allot of the NIPERNET "unclassified" network is just plain unruly at it's best (I left the military in 2000, so maybe things have changed). Any shop with their ADP or IT staff can practically get a server up and running, build intranets, databases, etc. without practically anyone raising an eyebrow, this is at the command level. Allot of these systems are non-redundant, and pose single points of failures, etc, but again this is at the command level. After moving along the ranks, from a lowly seaman recruit running AUI, cat V, and fiber cabling on an aircraft carrier, to a Third Class Petty Officer stationed at The Unified Atlantic Region Network Operations Center in Norfolk, VA. I learned that this is not the case for Mission Critical systems, or for the SIPERNET "classified network". As Brad also stated the same. All I can say is this, and any ex-RM can say the same (Well RM's are extint now they are IT), I never worked in a building that had any windows, and that could not stand a very good shaking, that is, if it wasnt underground in the first place. Gerardo ----- Original Message ----- From: "Brad Knowles" <brad.knowles@skynet.be> To: "Sean Donelan" <sean@donelan.com>; <nanog@merit.edu> Sent: Monday, August 12, 2002 3:54 PM Subject: Re: $400 million network upgrade for the Pentagon
At 12:44 PM -0400 2002/08/12, Sean Donelan wrote:
Building a surviable network in such a small area, relatively speaking
the
Pentagon is small, is a much harder problem than diversity on a regional or even national network.
Keep in mind that it was DARPA that funded the original research on what we now call the Internet. There are plenty of clueless morons in the building (the one with four sides and a spare), but there are also some exceptionally sharp people.
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2002/0812/news-dod-08-12-02.asp
"Among the problems DOD encountered Sept. 11 was a computing environment with many points of failure -- applications or databases that, if removed, could not be recovered and critical network links that, if down, could not be worked around.
Perhaps true for the unclassified systems. But then they're not really that critical to the real day-to-day operations. Moreover, where the plane struck is not the side where the majority of this kind of networking is done.
I worked there for about five years. I know where a lot of the unclassified networking was done, and I know where a fair amount of the classified processing was done. The classified areas were not in any danger from the airplane attack.
-- Brad Knowles, <brad.knowles@skynet.be>
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania.
GCS/IT d+(-) s:+(++)>: a C++(+++)$ UMBSHI++++$ P+>++ L+ !E W+++(--) N+ !w--- O- M++ V PS++(+++) PE- Y+(++) PGP>+++ t+(+++) 5++(+++) X++(+++) R+(+++) tv+(+++) b+(++++) DI+(++++) D+(++) G+(++++) e++>++++ h--- r---(+++)* z(+++)