Dear all, Before the group takes on the pitchforks and torches and travels down to the hosting providers' headquarters - let's take a step back and look at the root of this issue: the memcached software has failed both the Internet community and its own memcached users. It is INSANE that memcached is/was[1] shipping with default settings that make the daemon listen and respond on UDP on INADDR_ANY. Did nobody take notes during the protocol wars where we were fodder for all the CHARGEN & NTP ordnance? The memcached software shipped with a crazy default that required no authentication - allowing everyone to interact with the daemon. This is an incredibly risky proposition for memcached users from a confidentiality perspective; and on top of that the amplification factor is up to 15,000x. WHAT?! And this isn't even new information, open key/value stores have been a security research topic for a number of years, these folks reported that in the 2015/2016 time frame they observed more than 100,000 open memcached instances: https://aperture-labs.org/pdf/safeconf16.pdf Vendors need to ensure that a default installation of their software does not pose an immediate liability to the user itself and those around them. No software is deployed in a vacuum. A great example of how to approach things is the behavior of the PowerDNS DNS recursor: this recursor - out of the box - binds to only 127.0.0.1, and blocks queries from RFC 1918 space. An operator has to consciously perform multiple steps to make it into the danger zone. This is how things should be. Kind regards, Job [1]: https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ce... ps. promiscuous defaults are bad, mmkay? Ask your BGP vendor for RFC 8212 support today! :-)