Re: UUNET connectivity in Minneapolis, MN

Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2005 16:06:05 +0000 (GMT) From: "Christopher L. Morrow" <christopher.morrow@mci.com> Subject: Re: UUNET connectivity in Minneapolis, MN
On Thu, 11 Aug 2005 interex@inetica.com wrote:
we had a loss of comercial power(coned) in the downers grove terminal. terminal is up on generator power now.
that seems to map to the internal firedrill as well, anyone else hit by this event?
Electric utility had a sub-station burn up. resulting in a medium-sized geographic area without power -- something like 17,000 residences according to news reports (no numbers on 'commercial' custeomrs provided). AT&T has a facility in the affected area, and were also without utility power. Rumor mill says that Sprint had a (moderately small) number of T-3 circuits affected, as well.

info from the local news stations http://www.nbc5.com/news/4836579/detail.html?z=dp&dpswid=2265994&dppid=65192 http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-050811outage,0,6108555.story?co ll=chi-news-hed
-----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog@merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of Robert Bonomi Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 11:17 AM To: nanog@merit.edu Subject: Re: UUNET connectivity in Minneapolis, MN
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2005 16:06:05 +0000 (GMT) From: "Christopher L. Morrow" <christopher.morrow@mci.com> Subject: Re: UUNET connectivity in Minneapolis, MN
On Thu, 11 Aug 2005 interex@inetica.com wrote:
we had a loss of comercial power(coned) in the downers grove terminal. terminal is up on generator power now.
that seems to map to the internal firedrill as well, anyone else hit by this event?
Electric utility had a sub-station burn up. resulting in a medium-sized geographic area without power -- something like 17,000 residences according to news reports (no numbers on 'commercial' custeomrs provided).
AT&T has a facility in the affected area, and were also without utility power.
Rumor mill says that Sprint had a (moderately small) number of T-3 circuits affected, as well.

we had a loss of comercial power(coned) in the downers grove terminal. terminal is up on generator power now.
that seems to map to the internal firedrill as well, anyone else hit by this event?
Electric utility had a sub-station burn up. resulting in a medium-sized geographic area without power -- something like 17,000 residences according to news reports (no numbers on 'commercial' custeomrs provided).
AT&T has a facility in the affected area, and were also without utility power.
Rumor mill says that Sprint had a (moderately small) number of T-3 circuits affected, as well.
ATT must adhere to some diffrent engineering standards; as well devices we monitor there were all fine no blips... but all of the MCI customers we have in IL, MI, WI, MN all had issues... Power went out at 4:30 ish and ckts all dumped about 8:30 pm... Then bounced until 6:30 AM this morning. Not sure I understand how on earth something like this happens... power is not that confusing to make sure it does not stop working. JD

ATT must adhere to some diffrent engineering standards; as well devices we monitor there were all fine no blips... but all of the MCI customers we have in IL, MI, WI, MN all had issues...
Power went out at 4:30 ish and ckts all dumped about 8:30 pm...
Then bounced until 6:30 AM this morning.
Not sure I understand how on earth something like this happens... power is not that confusing to make sure it does not stop working.
JD
Maybe they actually *HAVE* standby generators. I have no sympathy for any provider for failure to plan for the inevitable power failure. I only have moderate sympathy for a failed standby generator. It's a diesel bolted to an alternator. The design was solidly debugged by the 1930s..... exercise it, be obsessive about preventative maintenance, keep the fuel polished, have extra filters on hand, and it will rarely let you down. Having to dish out SLA credits isn't punishment enough for failing to have standby power. On the other hand, if the customers are in contract, and a provider can get away with having their network fall down when there's a power outage and few if any customers actually go through the hassle of seeking SLA reimbursement, then it's really the customers' fault for the provider not having a generator. Yup, this is the screwed up world we live in. :-)

Not sure I understand how on earth something like this happens... power is not that confusing to make sure it does not stop working.
Is that so? Have you read the report on the Northeast blackout of 2003? https://reports.energy.gov/ --Michael Dillon

I certainly understand why utility power goes out and that is the reason why MCI loosing power confuses me. I am pretty sure that someone at MCI also realizes why the blackout happens and how fragile things are. It is irresponsible for a Tier 1 infrastructure provider to not be able to generate their own and have large chunks of their network fail do to the inability to power it. I bet you every SBC CO in the affected area was still pushing power out to customer prems. Unless there is some sort of crazy story related to why a service provider could not keep the lights on, this should have not been an issue with proper operations and engineering. JD On Fri, 12 Aug 2005 Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com wrote:
Not sure I understand how on earth something like this happens... power is not that confusing to make sure it does not stop working.
Is that so?
Have you read the report on the Northeast blackout of 2003? https://reports.energy.gov/
--Michael Dillon

-----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog@merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of James D. Butt
Unless there is some sort of crazy story related to why a service provider could not keep the lights on, this should have not been an issue with proper operations and engineering.
The building where one of our nodes sites got hit with an electrical fire in the basement one day, the fire department shut off all electrical to the whole building including the big diesel generators sitting outside the back of the building so all we had was battery power until that ran out 6 hours later. How do you prepare for that? Geo. George Roettger Netlink Services

Yes that is an exception... not what happened in this case.... You can come up with a lot of valid exceptions... There are many reasons why a Tier 1 provider does not stick all its eggs in multi-tenant buildings... smart things can be done with site selection. I am not saying ever customer needs to keep their network like this... but the really bug guys at the core of their network yes. JD On Fri, 12 Aug 2005, Geo. wrote:
-----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog@merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of James D. Butt
Unless there is some sort of crazy story related to why a service provider could not keep the lights on, this should have not been an issue with proper operations and engineering.
The building where one of our nodes sites got hit with an electrical fire in the basement one day, the fire department shut off all electrical to the whole building including the big diesel generators sitting outside the back of the building so all we had was battery power until that ran out 6 hours later.
How do you prepare for that?
Geo.
George Roettger Netlink Services

-----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog@merit.edu On Behalf Of James D. Butt
Unless there is some sort of crazy story related to why a service provider could not keep the lights on, this should have not been an issue with proper operations and engineering.
6 stories from the trenches Once a back hoe decided to punch through a high pressure natural gas main, right outside our offices. The fire department had us shut down ANYTHING that MIGHT make a spark. No nothing was able to run. It did not matter that we had uspes and such, all went dark for hours. During the Northridge earthquake (the one during the world series in sf.ba.ca.us) there was a BUNCH of disruption of the infrastructure, drives were shaken til they crashed, power wend down all over the area, Telco lines got knocked down, underground vaults got flooded, and data centers went off line. When ISDN was king(or ya get a t-1), I worked for an ISP in the bay area that was one of the few to have SOME connectivity when mae-w went down. We had a t-1 that went ânorthâ to another exchange point, and even though that little guy had %50+ packet loss, it kept chugging. We were one of the few ispâs that had ANY net connection, most of the people went in through their local MAE , (that was in the days before connecting to a MAE required that you be connected to several other MAEâs) Once while working for a startup in SF, I pushed for upses and backup power gen sets for our rack of boxes, and I was told that we were "in the middle of the finintial district of SF, that bart/the cable cars ran near by, and that a big huge sub station with in rock throwing distance of our building, not to mention a power plant a couple miles away. There was no reason for us to invest in backup gen sets, or hours of ups timeâ¦. I asked what the procedure was if we lost power for an extended period of time, and I was told, âwe go homeâ wellllllllâ¦â¦ the power went off to the entire SF region, and I was able to shut down the equipment with out to much trouble, cause my laptop was plugged into a ups (at my desk) and the critical servers were on a ups, as well as the hub I was on. After I verified that we were stil up at our co-lo (via my CDPD modem) I stated the facts to my boss, and told him that I was following his established procedure for extended power loss. I was on my way home. (boss=not happy) A backup generator failed at a co-lo because of algae in the diesel fuel. Another time a valve broke in the buildings HVAC system sending pink gooey water under the door , and into the machine room. There are reasons why a bunch of 9âs piled together, weird stuff does happen. This is nanog, each âold timerâ has a few dozen of these events they can relate. The first 2 ya realy canât prepare for other than for all your stuff to be mirrored âsome place elseâ, the rest are preventable, but they were still rare. ( back to an operational slant) Get a microwave t-2 and shoot it over to some other building, get a freaking cable modem as a backup, or find another way to get your lines out. If having things work is important to you, YOU should make sure it happens! If people are preventing you from doing your job (having servers up and reachable) CYA, and point it out in the post mortem. -charles Curse the dark, or light a match. You decide, it's your dark. Valdis.Kletnieks in NANOG

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During the Northridge earthquake (the one during the world series in sf.ba.ca.us) there was a BUNCH of disruption of the infrastructure, drives were shaken til they crashed, power wend down all over the area, Telco lines got knocked down, underground vaults got flooded, and data centers went off line.
Sorry.. wrong earthquake.. The Loma Prieta quake of 10/17/1989 occured during the opening game of the World Series, featuring the San Francisco Giants, and the Oakland Athletics in an all SF Bay area series. The epicenter was in the Santa Cruz mountains, in the vicinity of Mt Loma Prieta. Commercial power was lost to much of the bay area. The Northridge quake occured on 1/17/1994, in southern California. The epicenter was located in the San Fernando Valley, 20 miles NW of Los Angeles. As far as I recall, network disruption was minimal following the Northridge quake, with a few sites offline {due to a machine room flooding at UCLA?} -- Welcome My Son, Welcome To The Machine -- Bob Vaughan | techie @ tantivy.net | | P.O. Box 19792, Stanford, Ca 94309 | -- I am Me, I am only Me, And no one else is Me, What could be simpler? --

Unless there is some sort of crazy story related to why a service
provider
could not keep the lights on, this should have not been an issue with proper operations and engineering.
I'll let others tell you about the rat that caused a short circuit when Stanford attempted to switch to backup power. Or the time that fire crews told staff to evacuate a Wiltel colo near San Jose because of a backhoe that broke a gas pipe. The staff were prevented from starting their backup generators after power to the neighborhood was cut. In my opinion, the only way to solve this problem is to locate colos and PoPs in clusters within a city and deliver resilient DC power to these clusters from a central redundant generator plant. The generator plants, transmission lines and clusters can be engineered for resiliency. And then the highly flammable and dangerous quantities of fuel can be localized in a generator plant where they can be kept a safe distance from residential and office buildings. Unfortunately, to do this sort of thing requires vision which is something that has been lacking in the network operations field of late. --Michael Dillon

On Fri, 12 Aug 2005 06:50:47 CDT, "James D. Butt" said:
Unless there is some sort of crazy story related to why a service provider could not keep the lights on, this should have not been an issue with proper operations and engineering.
So a while ago, we're in the middle of some major construction to put in infrastructure for a supercomputer. Meanwhile, as an unrelated project we installed a new diesel backup generator to replace an older generator that was undersized for our current systems, and take several hours of downtime on a Saturday to wire the beast in. The next Friday, some contractors are moving the entrance to our machine room about 30 feet to the right, so you don't walk into the middle of the supercomputer. Worker A starts moving a small red switch unit from its location next to where the door used to be to its new location next to where the door was going to be. Unfortunately, he did it before double-checking with Worker B that the small red switch was disarmed... Ka-blammo, a Halon dump... and of course that's interlocked with the power, so once the Halon stopped hissing, it was *very* quiet in there..... Moral: It only takes one guy with a screwdriver.....

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 So I am standing in a datacenter fiddling with some fiber and listening to an electrician explaining to the datacenter owner how he has just finished auditing all of the backup power systems and that the transfer switch will work this time (unlike the last 3 times). This is making me a little nervous, but I keep quiet (unusual for me)... Electrician starts walking out of the DC, looks at the (glowing) Big Red Button (marked "Emergency Power Off") and says "Hey, why ya'll running on emergency power?" and presses BRB. Lights go dark, disks spin down, Warren takes his business elsewhere! This is the same DC that had large basement mounted generators in a windowless building in NYC. Weeks before the above incident they had tried to test the generator (one of the failed transfer switch incidents), but apparently no one knew that there were manual flues at the top of the exhausts.... Carbon monoxide, building evacuated... Warren On Aug 12, 2005, at 8:27 AM, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
On Fri, 12 Aug 2005 06:50:47 CDT, "James D. Butt" said:
Unless there is some sort of crazy story related to why a service provider could not keep the lights on, this should have not been an issue with proper operations and engineering.
So a while ago, we're in the middle of some major construction to put in infrastructure for a supercomputer. Meanwhile, as an unrelated project we installed a new diesel backup generator to replace an older generator that was undersized for our current systems, and take several hours of downtime on a Saturday to wire the beast in.
The next Friday, some contractors are moving the entrance to our machine room about 30 feet to the right, so you don't walk into the middle of the supercomputer. Worker A starts moving a small red switch unit from its location next to where the door used to be to its new location next to where the door was going to be. Unfortunately, he did it before double- checking with Worker B that the small red switch was disarmed...
Ka-blammo, a Halon dump... and of course that's interlocked with the power, so once the Halon stopped hissing, it was *very* quiet in there.....
Moral: It only takes one guy with a screwdriver.....
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participants (10)
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Bob Vaughan
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Charles Cala
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Erik Sundberg
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Geo.
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James D. Butt
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Jerry Pasker
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Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com
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Robert Bonomi
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Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
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Warren Kumari