In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Aug 2025: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2025: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2025-08-30 6181 FUSE-NET 2016-10-10 2025-08-28 63296 AWBROADBAND 2017-09-01 2025-08-21 22883 CONDENAST 2019-05-29 2025-08-25 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2025-08-28 22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC 2021-10-24 2025-08-25 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2025-08-28 400282 2023-04-27 2025-08-27 393577 SCCNET 2023-05-03 2025-08-25 61461 Airtek Solutions C.A. 2023-05-13 2025-08-28 20119 ARROW 2023-10-19 2025-08-30 394684 WISPERNET 2024-01-17 2025-08-29 27425 ASN-IDK-27425 2024-02-21 2025-08-29 393530 TLU 2024-05-22 2025-08-31 19935 CRRS 2024-05-29 2025-08-23 27523 DMB-ASN 2024-11-15 2025-08-20 273143 2025-03-01 2025-08-25 54334 ROYA 2025-03-13 2025-08-27 273843 2025-04-02 2025-08-29 32484 BAY-RADIOLOGY 2025-08-08 2025-08-08 20135 MTL-19 2025-08-21 2025-08-21 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org