On 11/23/11 3:38 PM, Jay Ashworth wrote:
Yes: but as Don Norman would ask: *where was the failure here*? You can't blame all of it on the field tech, even though he had the Last Clear Chance to avoid it, if the rest of the system wasn't designed to help protect him (procedures, labeling, packaging, etc...).
It, as with most cases of Things That go Horribly Wrong (tm) was not *a* failure but a series of them, none of which by itself would have been particularly significant.
I don't suppose that made the news, since there wasn't an actual collision?
Not outside of the Public Works and Risk Management Departments, but it was pretty big news there. The incident resulted in a 100% city-wide audit of all controller and conflict monitor programming by a two-person team as well as the procedure that every conflict monitor board would have a distinctively colored label placed on it with the name of the intersection, the date it was programmed, the name of the person who programmed it, and the name of the person who inspected the programming. -- Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - jay@impulse.net Impulse Internet Service - http://www.impulse.net/ Your local telephone and internet company - 805 884-6323 - WB6RDV