In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Feb 2025: ASN Name Fixed-By 5769 VIDEOTRON 2025-02-13 19935 CRRS 2025-02-17 62896 MIDCO-NET-INV-MR 2025-02-25 53274 3DB-WIRELESS 2025-02-27 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Feb 2025: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 40676 AS40676 2016-08-29 2025-02-24 27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2025-02-26 63296 AWBROADBAND 2017-09-01 2025-02-22 22883 CONDENAST 2019-05-29 2025-02-12 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2025-02-25 4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE 2021-05-12 2025-02-25 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2025-02-24 3701 NERONET 2023-04-18 2025-02-23 400282 2023-04-27 2025-02-24 393577 SCCNET 2023-05-03 2025-02-25 202400 2023-05-08 2025-02-25 61461 Airtek Solutions C.A. 2023-05-13 2025-02-25 20119 ARROW 2023-10-19 2025-02-27 394684 WISPERNET 2024-01-17 2025-02-23 19935 CRRS 2024-05-29 2025-02-05 3801 MISNET 2024-09-09 2025-02-26 13807 GREAT-PLAINS-COMMUNICATIONS 2024-10-09 2025-02-17 27523 DMB-ASN 2024-11-15 2025-02-25 30083 AS-30083-GO-DADDY-COM-LLC 2024-12-09 2025-02-24 273143 2025-01-22 2025-02-23 215672 2025-02-15 2025-02-15 398446 2025-02-24 2025-02-24 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org