You keep referring to the problem of OSPF causing the outage for AT&T and unaffected customers. The AT&T released RFO simply states that OSPF network statements were removed. That can happen just as easy with static routes and BGP network/neighbor statements.
OSPF did what it was instructed to do, just as BGP would have done if it were told to drop neighbors, or networks.
OSPF network statements were removed, according to RFO, which I have received, on one router. Can you please explain to me why customers in other *cities* which clearly were terminated into different routers were affected? Since we know based on our emprirical observation that it did happen, it can be concluded that AT&T has bad network design. It does not matter *why* customers who were not terminated into the affected routers could not use AT&T network. What matters is that they *could* b not use AT&T's network because AT&T's engineering made a choice of using a broken design. This broken design is going to cost AT&T a couple of million. Hopefully, at some point a VP of Engineering for AT&T is going to realize that his job is going to be on the line if stuff like this keeps happening, at which point certain engineers within AT&T are going to get their heads handed back to them on a platter. Again, hopefully at that point, those who remain at AT&T will realize that their existing design is broken and another outage is going to cost them their jobs and redo it. At the end we are going to have a lot more stability on the internet. As far as BGP would have done the same thing: would you mind desciring a configuration of BGP where deletion of a network statement in one router would cause unreachability across paths that do not *realy* on that network statement? Alex