Randy said, 
> From a practical standpoint, this doesn't actually tell the whole truth

indeed.  route origin validation, while a good thing, does not make
bgp safe from attack.  this marketing fantasy is being propagated;
but is BS.

origin validation was designed to reduce the massive number of problems
cause by fat figured configuration errors by operators.  it will not
even get all of those; but it will greatly improve things.

but it provides almost zero protection against malicious attack.  the
attacker merely has to prepend (in the formal, not cisco display) the
'correct' origin AS to their malicious announcement.  

Randy, I agree of course, that supporting ROV is far from sufficient to ensure BGP security. However, I disagree that this is `zero protection' since the effectiveness of the attack may be much reduced when the attacker has to prepend. Note also that if one combines ASPA, the protection would be even better. The simulation results in our SIGCOMM'2016 give some idea of these benefits (imprecise, of course). 

I _think_ Randy will agree; but then again, Randy loves to surprise , so ... maybe not.
--
Amir Herzberg

Comcast professor of Security Innovations, University of Connecticut

Foundations of Cyber-Security (part I: applied crypto, part II: network-security): 



On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 3:10 PM Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
> From a practical standpoint, this doesn't actually tell the whole truth

indeed.  route origin validation, while a good thing, does not make
bgp safe from attack.  this marketing fantasy is being propagated;
but is BS.

origin validation was designed to reduce the massive number of problems
cause by fat figured configuration errors by operators.  it will not
even get all of those; but it will greatly improve things.

but it provides almost zero protection against malicious attack.  the
attacker merely has to prepend (in the formal, not cisco display) the
'correct' origin AS to their malicious announcement.

randy